Conflict Between Arabs and Kurds in the Nineveh Province
A Report by the International Crisis group
October 10, 2009
Trans. from arabic
International Crisis Group: Minorities in the Nineveh province have been turned into mere pawns in the conflict between Arabs and Kurds.
The
International Crisis Group recently reported from Iraq devoted to the conflict between the Arabs and Kurds in the Nineveh province, calling on the two groups and the Baghdad government to reach compromises with the U.S. intervention. Although the violence has subsided in most parts of Iraq, but the slaughter still continues in Mosul, where Arabs and Kurds appear to be stuck in a political road blocked, the report says.
The bloodshed and institutional paralysis, has shifted from sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites mainly concentrated in the capital Baghdad, to a large extent, to the battle between the Arabs and ethnic Kurds. It would be almost impossible to resolve the crisis without addressing the outstanding political issues at the level of the whole country. However, the Nineveh can not wait. There is a need to take urgent steps interim to ensure a fair sharing of power at the local level, and conduct joint security patrols between Arabs and Kurds in the disputed districts, in addition to providing better protection for minorities.
This requires continued active U.S. role. For the Arabs and the Kurds, Kirkuk remains the real prize and is the cause of raging emotions to the fullest extent, where the largest oil reserves have been discovered. this issue by itself is , turning a lot of national and international attention to Kirkuk, efforts are beening made, if not to end the conflict, at least to freeze it. But that is not the case in the Nineveh Province, which has become the main front of the battle between the ethnic groups.
The report says that interference in Nineveh province between the pan-Arabists and the Kurd is particularly sharp, notably in the provincial capital, the city of Mosul, a stronghold of deep-rooted feelings. The Kurds pay a heavy price, as the state's aggressivly attempts to contain or suppress their national aspirations. While Baathist regime of saddam ngaged in forced displacements, and distribution of resources from the Kurds to the Arabs, Kurds saw an opportunity to correct this imbalance in 2003 by staging an offensive to turn the clock back and remove the effects of past practices. This has had its cost. Kurds have acted in a non-structured manner to do what they deemed to be to their interest without following legal procedures.
They consolidated and controled by force of several districts of a number of towns and villages in the Plain of Nineveh to attach them to the Kurdish region. Due to the boycott by Sunni Arabs for the local elections that took place in 2005, they managed to tighten political control over the province. At the same time, Nineveh proved to be a fertile ground for the Sunni insurgency, which unleashed the growing anti-Kurds and Shiites campaign. The groups that took up arms against U.S. forces and Kurdish by infiltating through the long and often unguarded, Syrian border, and found enthusiastic volunteers among the Baathists and former officers, the young people who are suffering from extreme poverty, to impose authority in areas with a Sunni Arab majority.
Thus Nineveh, between 2003 and 2005, was caught between Kurdish control and the armed Sunni groups gradually shifted to the political scene, I overestimated the armed groups, especially the Islamic, the use of force; and revived the American forces and Iraqi efforts to promote stability in Nineveh; sought Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to halt and reverse the progress of the Kurds on the ground. It may be the most important element is the entry of Sunni Arab leaders involved in politics and alliances in terms of a national anti-response significantly. the local elections held last January set a new stage in the game of tug of war between the Arabs and Kurds.
Four years ago, Sunni Arabs largely boycotted the elections, considering the political process as illegal. But this time they were not about to repeat the same mistake. Consequently they launched a campaign focused on two main issues: the Arab identity of Nineveh, without prejudice to the de facto borders drawn up in the Baathist era, which had separated the province from Kurdistan since October 1991.
During the elections Kurdish parties won about one third of the seats in the province under the banner of "List of Nineveh sister"; and that was the result that they expected given the proportion of the population. But despite the acceptance of many of the retreat with them in the elections, they feared the hostile rhetoric of the Kurds, who strongly marked by the "hump", and felt resentful of efforts to reduce the influence of the military, administrative and cultural response, and insisted on sharing power. Rejected the «hump» the latter requirement, Faqata Kurdish provincial council.
The paralysis of the local government resulting from this, accompanied by a decision to re-impose the authority of local government on the disputed land, which until then had been under Kurdish control. further terrifying tension. happened mainly in areas of conflict where Arabs and Kurds for control of the administrative, and where the Iraqi army confronting each with the Kurdish Peshmerga on both sides of the line of tension .
On several occasions, the government forces of Arab and Kurdish forces came into direct collision. what has exacerbated the situation in the province and have contributed to unstability are large number of armed groups, both formal and informal. There is a national army and police, and security forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or peshmerga, and the remnants of armed groups of the Sunni Arabs and clan militia. There are ethnic and religious minorities caught between the Arabs and Kurds, the central government has shown not much interest in them.
Along with the Arab majority and the powerful Kurdish minority, a number of smaller groups: Christians, Turkmen and Yazidies they constitute an estimated 10% of the population, which are concentrated in a territories disputed between Kurdistan and the Arab Iraq. These groups have been subjected to larger share of the suffering caused by war, occupation and the violence that erupted between religious groups and ethnic groups.
Today Vtsara these groups in order to survive. I have some disadvantageous groups sometimes, and threatened her with one camp at other times, and are the result merely pawns in a conflict is not considered only fuel it. Recently there are indications that the Federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, with the help and pressure from the United States, are seeking to address this problem, but the risks remain high, especially since the U.S. withdrawal has begun, and will have unpredictable consequences for various parties, and the overall balance of power.
Although the strength of armed groups has diminished, but they remain active. The use of these groups to focus on attacks against the Kurds, or the escalation of violence against minority groups in the disputed areas, in the hope of promoting instability and acts of vengeance between Arabs and Kurds. Should any successful effort to defuse the crisis to be a two-track, the fundamental problem is worsening in Iraq concerning the distribution of power, land and resources. With the approaching general elections early next year, it is difficult to imagine the involvement of the central government, or the Kurdistan Regional Government or any party in a local political settlement expensive, whatever the need is urgent. At the county level, steps can be more realistic. It should reach the Arabs and the Kurds to the interim agreement granted the Kurds a legitimate share of power, while allowing the Arabs governance to be integrated into the army and police official in the Kurdish units of the Federal Army and security forces Nineveh and joint patrols.
And minorities should be given more attention by providing them greater employment. The idea promoted by some U.S. officials, and the involvement of American soldiers on a temporary basis in joint patrols between the army and the Peshmerga, is a good idea, not only because that would have a direct positive effects, but because it send a message about Washington's commitment to long-term, stability of Iraq.
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